Motives of mergers and acquisitions by state-owned enterprises: a taxonomy and international evidence by M. Florio et al.
International Journal of Public Sector Management
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motives of Mergers and Acquisitions by State-Owned 
Enterprises:  
A Taxonomy and International Evidence  
 
 
Journal: International Journal of Public Sector Management 
Manuscript ID IJPSM-02-2017-0050.R2 
Manuscript Type: Original Article 
Keywords: 
State-owned enterprises, M&As, Privatization, nationalization, shareholder-
value maximization 
  
 
 
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijpsm
International Journal of Public Sector Management
International Journal of Public Sector Management
 1 
Motives of Mergers and Acquisitions by State-Owned Enterprises:  
A Taxonomy and International Evidence 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper looks at state-owned enteprises (SOEs) from the angle of the Market for Corporate 
Control (MCC) and analyzes in detail the reported rationales of a sample of 355 M&A deals 
performed by SOEs as acquirers over the period 2002–2012. The aim, after having created a 
taxonomy of deal motivations, is to empirically test two alternative hypotheses: Deviation 
versus Convergence of M&A deal rationales between state-owned and private enterprises. 
Design/methodology/approach 
The data set is obtained by combining firm-level information from two sources, Zephyr and 
Orbis (Bureau Van Dijk). A recursive algorithm is developed to infer the ownership nature of 
the enterprises at the time the deal took place and then we double-check the identity of the 
global ultimate owner by visual inspection of all the available information. Motivations are 
analyzed through a case-by-case analysis and classified into several categories, thereby 
providing a taxonomy of rationales behind SOE M&As and discussing their differences and 
similarities relative to private firms.  
Findings 
More than 60% of the deals performed by SOEs as acquirers are driven by “shareholder-value 
maximization” motives, similarly to private enterprise acquirers. The other 40% of deals are 
almost equally spread among three rationales that specifically relate to the role of modern 
state capitalism in the economy. “Financial distress” motivation, which is the only one clearly 
deviating from the objectives of profit maximization typical of private ownership, is far less 
important than the others. 
Originality 
Existing literature has mainly focused on private corporate M&A deals or has just disregarded 
the ownership status of the acquiring firm. This paper focuses on the motivations for SOE 
deals in order to elaborate a taxonomy of SOE deal rationales and to identify differences and 
similarities between private corporate firms.  
Research limitations 
The paper does not analyze in detail the case studies. Neither does it correlate the evidence 
with the quality of corporate governance or the quality of institutions in the country. This 
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would be interesting in order to discover whether the alignment of objectives between public 
and private enterprises is enhanced by certain features of public sector management, as 
suggested by the OECD (2015) Guidelines.  
Policy implications 
The paper suggests some policy implications in terms of reforms of the corporate governance 
of the SOEs and accountability of their management against clearly stated public missions.  
It also calls for the need for citizens to be informed in a transparent way about the rationales 
of major M&A deals when a SOE is on the acquirer side, and the consistency of such 
rationales with the mission assigned by governments to the enterprises they own. Finally, it 
underlines that regulatory concerns raised in many countries by the rise of cross-border SOE 
M&As are in most of the cases unfounded. 
 
 
JEL Codes: L32, L33, G34 
Keywords: state-owned enterprises, M&As, nationalization, privatization, shareholder-value 
maximization 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increase in the number of academic publications on 
contemporary state-owned enteprises (SOEs)[1] and their differences from, and similarities 
to, private firms. The growing attention is motivated not only by the expanding size of 
SOEs[2], but also by significant changing dynamics that have shaped their contemporary 
features and role. In fact, contemporary SOEs have been strongly reorganized in terms of 
governance rules, regulatory framework, business re-engineering, accountability and 
transparency standards, and they have become more mixed enterprises, with enhanced 
competitive capabilities and facing similar issues and challenges to those faced by private 
enterprises (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2014; Florio 2014; Bruton et al. 2015; Lebedev et al. 2015; 
Musacchio et al. 2015; He et al. 2016; Peng et al. 2016). In addition, contemporary SOEs 
more and more frequently play a relevant function in promoting research and innovation, in 
fostering long-term and/or high-risk capital-intensive projects (Millward 2011; De Olloqui 
2013; Eslava and Freixas 2016), and in channeling funds to long-term societal challenges 
(Mazzuccato and Penna 2016).  
Among recent publications, an increasing number of papers are focusing on M&A (Chen and 
Young 2010; Wu and Xie 2010; Lebedev et al. 2015; Reddy et al. 2016; Bacchiocchi et al. 
2017; Clò et al. 2017; Del Bo et al. 2017;  Karolyi and Liao 2017; Xie et al. 2017). The 
reason for such a specific interest in this one important aspect of the new activisim of SOEs is 
the role they are playing in the Market for Corporate Control (MCC), where they are acquirers 
in a significant number of deals – both domestic and cross-border – and for a significant 
amount of assets. In the last decade the cumulative value of the target assets purchased by 
SOEs was reported to be no less than 690 billion euros, which is 30% of the total assets of the 
targets traded in the M&A arena (Clò et al. 2015). In the same period, in the financial 
industry, more than 10% of M&A deals involved state-owned banks as acquirers 
(Bacchiocchi et al. 2017). Governments also acquire assets in the MCC through Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, which are the fastest growing class of asset owners since 2000, with a reported 
size of around 5 trillion dollars, and which regularly invest in listed and unlisted targets in 
developed and emerging markets (Bortolotti et al. 2015). 
The goal of our paper is to contribute to this recent field of finance literature with a det iled 
analysis of the main reported rationales behind a sample of SOE-led M&As over the last 
decade. Specifically, we analyze the extent to which recent changes that are reshaping the 
overall activity of contemporary SOEs are also affecting their strategic investment choices 
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and behaviors in the MCC, and whether acquirer motivations are more aligned with the 
rationales traditionally identified in the empirical literature for private firms. Why is a firm 
that is ultimately owned by a government willing to acquire another state-owned or private-
owned enterprise? Is there any similarity to the rationales underlying private-owned enterprise 
deals? Or are they motivated by the need to reach strategic social or welfare goals, 
particularly after the Great Recession?  
Our sample includes a detailed study of 355 worldwide M&A deals performed by SOEs as 
acquirers over the period 2002–2012. The deals’ rationales are reported by Zephyr (Bureau 
Van Dyck) based on a variety of sources. Additionally, Zephyr provides information on the 
global ultimate owner (GUO) for each acquirer, vendor and target involved in each deal. 
Given that the GUO provided by Zephyr refers only to the latest available year, rather than 
the year in which the deal occurred, we first had to resolve ownership identification issues to 
avoid potential sampling errors due to wrongly considering as government-owned (private-
owned) a firm that is currently government-owned (private-owned) but was not at the time of 
the deal. We therefore developed an ad hoc algorithm to correctly infer the ownership nature 
of the enterprises at the time the deal took place. Furthermore, we double-checked the identity 
of the GUO of the remaining 355 deals by visual inspection. We then analyzed motivations 
through a case-by-case analysis and classified them into several categories, thereby providing 
a taxonomy of rationales behind SOE M&As and speculating on their differences and 
similarities compared to private firms. Within our sample, around 80% of the deals are 
represented by majority acquisitions, with 143 of these being total acquisitions. A 
considerable proportion of deals are cross-border (43%), and the concentration of deals is 
higher in the finance, electricity and mining industries. 
Our main finding is that the most common motivation behind acquisitions performed by 
SOEs is shareholder-value maximization, by means of expected efficiency gains, an increase 
in market power and risk diversification. This rationale is not different from that of a private 
firm, in line with recent findings that suggest that modern SOEs are more finance- and 
market-oriented than in the last century and that they offer public services in a more 
businesslike manner (Bozec and Breton 2003; Levesque 2003; Aivazian et al. 2005; Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. 2014;  Florio 2014; Bruton et al. 2015; Clò et al. 2015; Grossi et al. 2015; 
Lebedev et al. 2015; Musacchio et al. 2015; He et al. 2016). Moreover, we detect a group of 
deals that are driven by motivations that specifically relate to the role of modern state 
capitalism in the economy, such as the development of innovative sectors (e.g. renewable and 
environment-friendly energy), and the pursuit of national strategic goals by means of rent 
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extraction and accumulation of resources. M&As for the purpose of bailing out distressed 
firms deviate from the principle of value maximization, but we find that this is far from being 
the main rationale of SOE M&As. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
theoretical framework and a taxonomy of corporate M&A rationales. Section 3 describes our 
data set of deals performed by SOEs as acquirers. Section 4 focuses on the rationale of SOE 
deals, and Section 5 discusses the main findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. M&A rationales in the corporate firm literature 
Since Manne’s seminal paper (1965), a substantial academic literature on M&A activity has 
developed. This extensive literature collects contributions from different academic fields – 
including finance, management, industrial organization and business administration – and 
analyzes the phenomenon from multifarious viewpoints, such as stock market reactions and 
pre- and post-merger accounting performance (Agrawal and Jaffe 1995; Andrade and Stafford 
2004; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 2004; Breinlich 2008;  De Young et al. 2009), 
differences between domestic and cross-border deals (Rossi and Volpin 2004; Bris et al. 
2008; Coeurdacier et al. 2009; Ferreira et al. 2010;  Erel et al. 2012; Karolyi and Liao 2017), 
waves clustered by industries (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; Andrade and Stafford 2004; 
Harford 2005; Hackbarth and Miao 2012), and impact on competition, economic growth and 
innovation (Piscitello 2004; Cassiman et al. 2005; Carow et al. 2006; Craig and Hardee 2007; 
Wand and Wong 2009). All these different analyses have contributed to the elucidation of a 
crucial underlying relevant question: Why do firms enter into M&A deals? 
From a corporate finance perspective, the rationales behind M&A deals can be distinguished 
into two broad categories: shareholder-value maximization and utility maximization of other 
stakeholders, including firms’ managers. In the first case, firms enter M&A deals to increase 
the shareholder value of the merged firms by means of efficiency gains (Weston et al. 1990; 
Houston et al. 2001), risk reduction in terms of product and geographical diversification 
(Amihud and Baruch 1981; Denis et al. 2002), and increase in market power through entering 
a new market or reducing competition (Martin and McConnell 1991; Gugler et al. 2003; 
Lanine and Vennet 2007). The utility maximization motive refers, conversely, to the 
maximization of managers’ or other stakeholders’ utility rather than the enterprise value for 
shareholders. For example, according to principal-agent theory, managers may indeed have an 
incentive to make a merger in order to maximize their own compensation (or their ego), or 
Page 5 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijpsm
International Journal of Public Sector Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Public Sector Management
 6 
build a personal empire, or live a “quiet life” rather than to maximize the 
shareholder/enterprise value (Jensen 1986; Matsusaka 1993). Managers of politically 
connected firms (Faccio 2006) may also consider the utility of other stakeholders, such as 
politicians (Luo and Tung 2007). 
Within the M&A literature, little attention has been devoted to acquisitions undertaken by 
SOEs (Lebedev et al. 2015). Only recently has there been a rising interest in M&A deals 
performed by government-owned acquirers specifically. For example, Karolyi and Liao 
(2017) focus on 127,786 cross-border M&A deals over the period 1990–2008 with the aim of 
analyzing differences and similarities compared to equivalent private sector activities. They 
find that government-owned acquirers and corporate acquirers are similar in their behavior on 
the MCC, particularly in pursuing smaller targets, in related industries, with fewer growth 
opportunities. Clò et al. (2017) analyze a sample of 24,726 deals worldwide, 10% of which 
involve a government-owned acquirer, and find that on average SOEs take over 
underperforming targets, similarly to private firms; results are stronger when the government 
owns more than 50% of shares. Likewise, Bacchiocchi et al. (2017) focus on the financial 
industry and analyze 3,682 deals involving banks during the last decade. They find that state-
owned financial institutions that are active in the MCC are at least as efficient and profitable 
as their private benchmarks, and this finding is clearly stronger for development banks than 
for commercial state-owned banks. Focusing on cross-border M&As by Chinese companies, 
Wu and Xie (2010) find, for the acquirer, a positive relationship between state ownership and 
performance.  The opposite result is found in Chen and Young (2010) for Chinese firms and 
in Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) for the Russian market: Both showed a negative 
relationship between state ownership and acquirer’s performance. See also Del Bo et al. 
(2017) who focus on the pre-deal characteristics of acquirers in deals involving SOEs 
(including privatization).  
All these papers have analyzed differences and similarities in the performance of SOEs’ 
M&A deals compared to private enterprises, and have only focused indirectly on the 
motivation behind deals. Conversely, the novelty of our paper is that we focus directly on the 
rationales for SOE deals, as reported by managers before the deal occurred and from other 
sources, with the aim of identifying differences and similarities between the above-mentioned 
motivations. The working hypotheses we want to study in our paper are as follows: 
Deviation Hypothesis 
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H0: M&A-reported rationales of deals with a SOE as acquirer differ from the rationales of 
private firms because SOEs’ objectives deviate from shareholder value-maximization and are 
bounded by political objectives, consistent with previous traditional literature on SOEs. 
However, recent evidence suggests an alternative working hypothesis. 
Convergence Hypothesis 
H1: following the recent literature trends on SOEs, we expect there not to be relevant 
differences in rationales since the goals between private and contemporary public enterprises 
are aligned. 
Our research question is simple: Which one of the two alternative hypotheses is supported by 
the evidence? 
It is worth underlining that our research question, and in particular the Convergence 
Hypothesis, falls within a field of research, developed in the business and management 
discipline, that highlights how the dynamics of SOEs in the new century and their importance 
on the global scene call for a reconsideration of the theories of the firm, which are, 
conversely, traditionally mainly based on private firms’ evidence. Within this literature a 
relevant paper is Peng et al. (2016), which emphasizes the need to address the uniqueness of 
SOEs and identify new propositions and testable hypotheses that extend existing theories of 
the firm to explicitly incorporate SOEs’ organizational form. Among the theories analyzed by 
the authors – namely the property right theory, the transformation costs theory, the agency 
theory and the research-based theory – a special focus is dedicated to the latter, and 
specifically to the competitive advantage that may arise for SOEs from the combination of 
market-based resources (e.g. production, technological, financial, organizational resources) 
and nonmarket-based resources, such as political capabilities. Although the role of market-
based capabilities is crucial to compete effectively in product markets (see also Lebedev et al. 
2015; Mutlu et al. 2015), nonmarket-based resources are likely to be a source of 
differentiation and competitive advantage for SOEs in the global field, given their stronger 
political ties and their embedded value, especially in utilities and transportation industries 
where the influence of the state is stronger (Peng 2012). Li et al. (2013), in analyzing the role 
of political resources and capabilities in emerging economies, develop the concept of 
“ambidexterity” to highlight the need for enterprises to manage influences from both markets 
and government simultaneously, which is especially relevant in economies undergoing 
institutional transitions (Peng 2003), where rules are changing faster (Li et al. 2012, Sun et al. 
2011). Okhmatovskiy (2010) focuses on business–government relationships and highlights 
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that benefits may come both from influencing government policies and gaining access to 
state-controlled resources. 
The issue underlying this field of research is fueled by the evidence that the gap between 
private firms and state-owned firms, as portrayed until recently, has narrowed over the years, 
due to the changes that have reshaped SOEs of the new century. Many authors from the 
international business and strategic management discipline have focused on these recent 
dynamics, in particular on the role of SOEs as acquirer on the international scene after the 
2008 crisis and with a special focus on Chinese SOEs. Among them, Ma et al. (2014), using a 
sample of Chinese firms, focus on the consequences of internationalization on the firm value 
of emerging market firms after the global economic crisis. Increasing cross-border business 
activities conducted by emerging market firms enables them to benefit from strategic 
flexibility and enhanced opportunities in terms of foreign sales intensity, and the realization 
of such benefits is influenced by the levels of ownership held by different types of ownership 
groups. The growing presence and power of SOEs in global markets is highlighted by Bass 
and Chakrabarty et al. (2014). The authors focus on the activities of SOEs in competing in 
strategic industries related to natural resources in order to pursue both business and political 
goals by building economic value outside the country and securing future access to resources, 
while Meyer et al. (2014) focus on Chinese multinational enterprises and highlight how SOEs 
adapt their entries to institutional pressures abroad to increase their legitimacy. Finally, Xie et 
al. 2016, based on 257 firms listed on the Chinese market, used the resource-based theory and 
the behavioural theory to investigate how firms’ knowledge-based resources (technological 
and marketing) and performance compared to aspirations affect their rapid 
internationalization expansion, while Peng (2012), focusing on the international expansion of 
Chinese multinational enterprises, analyzes the so far ignored role of home country 
government as an institutional force that may use policy tools, such as low-interest financing, 
favorable exchange rates, and reduced taxation to facilitate outward foreign direct 
investments. 
 
3. The data set 
 
Our data set was obtained by combining firm-level information from two sources: Zephyr and 
Orbis (Bureau Van Dijk)[3]. Zephyr contains information about the type, year and reported 
rationales of M&A deals. Additionally, for each acquirer, vendor and target involved in each 
deal, Zephyr provides information on the country, the NACE sector, and the global ultimate 
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owner [4]. However, since the GUO provided by Zephyr refers only to the latest available 
year, rather than the year when the deal occurred, we needed to develop an algorithm to 
extract only those observations for which neither the vendor nor the acquiring company 
involved in a deal (at time t) figure as target companies in a subsequent deal (at any time 
t+j)[5]. We have been able to identify 3,550 deals performed by SOE acquirers from the 
evidence available for the time span 2002–2012. We then matched Zephyr data with financial 
statement information provided by Orbis in order to have accounting data on the acquirers, 
and finally dropped deals without adequate accounting data or a description of the rationale.  
The result of this strict selection procedure is a worldwide sample of 355 M&A deals, for 
which we are sure that the acquirer is a SOE, for which accounting data are available and, 
critically for our research questions, for which the rationales for the deals are reported. 
Interestingly, almost 75% of the deals (260 deals) are “public–private,” that is an M&A where 
state-owned enterprises acquired a target company owned by a private vendor enterprise, 
while 25% of the deals (95 deals) are “public–public,” that is state-owned enterprises 
acquiring a company from a state-owned vendor[6]. One hundred and eight state-owned 
enterprises were involved as acquirers in the 355 deals. By comparison, the sample 
considered in Del Bo et al. (2017) includes 887 public–private deals, around 3% of the total 
(31,479) and around 54% of the deals with a public acquirer (1,638 public–public and public–
private). In Clò et al. (2017) the public–private sample includes 1,034 deals, around 8% of the 
full sample (13,475) and around 60% of the deals are with a public acquirer (1,724 deals). In 
our sample, which is restricted by the availability of reported evidences on the rationales, 
around 73% of the total (355) are public–private deals.  
Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2 provide information on the number of M&As performed by 
SOEs, broken down by geographical and sector distribution in our sample. The most 
significant features in our data are the high number of deals performed in Western Europe and 
the Far East and Asia, in line with larger waves of nationalizations that occurred in the last 
two decades (Voszka 2017), and the considerable share of cross-border deals. In fact, 
although the number of domestic deals is higher than the number of cross-border deals (204 
and 151, respectively), the significant share of cross-border deals underlines the sizable 
participation of SOEs in the market for cross-border acquisitions, in line with recent empirical 
evidences (Karolyi and Liao, 2017). This holds especially for China, where, from 2015, there 
has been a growth in the outbound SOE M&A activity of up to 45% by volume and 141% by 
value of the deals (PwC 2017). This surge – mainly motivated by a favorable regulatory and 
financing environment – is focused not only on energy and resources enterprises, but also on 
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targets operating in advanced technologies, knowledge production, consumer-related and 
entertainment sectors, consistent with the ongoing transformation of the Chinese economy. In 
line with this shift, the targets of China’s outbound M&As are now more frequently located in 
developed countries. We further discuss later the Chinese case.  
In our sample, deals are concentrated in three main industries: finance, electricity and mining. 
One third of the deals has been performed in the same NACE sector (4 digits). 
As far as the distribution of deals by sector of the acquirer, the highest shares belong to 
finance (105 deals), electricity (44 deals) and mining (43 deals). Diversification strategies are 
mainly performed by financial acquirers, while for other industries acquisitions are mainly 
within the same sector or closely related sectors (i.e. mining SOEs invest in oil & gas; oil & 
gas SOEs invest in transport). Not surprisingly, public–public deals are all domestic: they are 
mainly a reorganization of public entities within national boundaries. State-owned enterprises 
in the finance, mining, telecommunication and transportation industries acquire cross-border 
targets almost as frequently as domestic companies, while in the other industries acquisitions 
are mainly in-border.  
 
 
 
<Figure 1> 
 
<Table 1> 
 
<Table 2> 
 
Regarding the distribution of deals over time, 116 deals were performed in the years prior to 
the 2008 crisis, and almost 239 after it. Among them, a significant number of deals were 
rescue operations motivated by the financial distress of the target and performed by SOEs in 
line with the countercyclical role they played after the crisis. A not negligible number of deals 
(6%) have a value greater than one billion euros, while the median is much lower. Firms 
involved in the highest value deals are Saudi Industries Corporation, the Argentinean 
Government, Gazprom, Swisscom AG, China Huaneng Group, ABN AMRO Holding NV 
and Belgacom SA. Around 40% of the deals is represented by total acquisitions, another 40% 
by “majority acquisitions” (greater than 50% of stakes), and the remainder by acquisitions of 
minority shares (Table 3).  
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<Table 3> 
 
 
 
4. Reported rationale for M&As performed by SOEs: Selected examples 
 
In this section we focus on deal motivation, our main research interest in this paper. For each 
deal in our sample, Zephyr reports the motivation using several sources, among others 
declarations by the management of the firm involved in the agreement. We analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis all the rationales of our sample, and we classified them into several 
categories with the aim of identifying differences and similarities compared to private firms 
[7].  
Our main finding is that the majority of SOE rationales for M&A deals are similar to those 
identified in the empirical literature for corporate firms. Indeed, the most frequently reported 
rationale is shareholder-value maximization, in the form of: 
o  efficiency gains (technical, synergic); 
o  increase in market power; 
o  diversification. 
However, a not negligible number of deals are driven by different motivations, which 
specifically relate to the role of modern state capitalism in the economy. As has been 
highlighted in recent literature on SOEs, these rationales are not necessarily inconsistent with 
shareholder-value maximization [8]. 
A first group of deal rationales identifies the governments’ strategic policy to play an active 
role in: 
- the development of innovative projects, for example in the field of climate finance, 
renewable and environmentally friendly energy; 
- the development of competitive physical and technological infras ructure, through the 
acquisition of strategic enterprises or by means of strategic alliance.  
These deals are aimed at increasing capitalization in strategic and innovative sectors that 
require investments that are typically large-scale and risky, calling for patient capital and 
synergies in terms of know-how and R&D. We call this rationale “innovation.”  
A second group of deals identifies the governments’ political strategy to strengthen its 
competitive position in domestic and cross-border markets in order to extract rents or 
accumulate resources from subsoil, oil, gas or mining, as well as to guarantee energy products 
and raw materials to serve the collective good of the country. Deals are typically performed 
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by firms that belong to specific industries (mainly mining and oil and gas) and have a central 
role in the global economy, such as the oil giants Gazprom and Petroleo Brasileiro. We call 
this rationale “rent-extraction.”  
A third group of M&A rationales relate to debt restructuring and the bail-out of financially 
distressed firms arising because of severe market failures, such as the 2008 crisis. We call this 
rationale “financial distress.”  
To offer some immediate  intuition, Table 4 reports several examples of motivations for the 
four types of deals, which are explained in detail in the next sections . 
<Table 4> 
 
 
4.1 Shareholder’s value maximization 
The shareholder-value maximization rationale is spread across sectors and geographical areas 
and is the most prevalent motivation for SOE M&A deals. Similarly to private firms, 
government-owned enterprises also pursue this goal by means of higher levels of efficiency, 
diversification and risk reduction, increase in market power and entry into new markets. We 
report below some illustrative examples of motivations specifically relating to technical and 
strategic efficiency, diversification and increase in market power. 
Technical and strategic efficiency  
The French Areva targeted a firm engaged in the provision of technological solutions for 
carbon dioxide-free nuclear power generation from the British Urenco with a purpose “to 
share knowledge of efficient, economic and environmentally friendly technology.” Increase in 
net income by means of economies of scale and scope is also the driver of the M&A deal 
performed by the Suisse Rual, which acquired 100% of Oerlikon Space in order to combine 
“businesses under one umbrella as a competitive aerospace supplier out of the three countries 
Switzerland, Sweden and Austria strengthening RUAG’s position and to opening up new 
attractive opportunities for our customers and partners as well as our staff”. 
The Chinese manufacturing group Shanghai Electric acquired the North-American Goss 
International Corporation, which was engaged in the wholesale distribution of printing trade 
machinery and equipment with an aim to “bring additional strength and financial resources to 
the business and further enhance the ability to innovate, execute and deliver value to 
customers through a unique, worldwide manufacturing and support platform that includes 
operations in Asia, Europe and the United States.” Similarly, the Suisse Sicap acquired the 
French Swapcom, engaged in computer programming activities, with an aim to “enable 
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operators to drive new revenue opportunities, offer lower operating costs and increase 
customer satisfaction and loyalty.”  
Market power 
The Malaysian Th Plantation, a company principally involved in the cultivation of oil palm, 
acquired 100% of Ladang Bukit Belian, which was engaged in the business of growing 
cereals and oil seeds “in order to strengthen the company’s business in Malaysia (…) with the 
aim to create the world’s largest oil palm plantation group with core business in motor 
vehicle, heavy equipment, property and energy utilities.” In a different sector, the financial 
company Abn Amro acquired a participation in the Belgian Bank Corluy Effectenbankiers “to 
strengthen our Belgian market position and the quality and expertise of our local services,” 
and the Norwegian Itella Information, which engaged in activities auxiliary to financial 
services, acquired 100% stake in the German Newsource GmbH, which was involved in the 
provision of business process outsourcing (BPO) solutions, with the aim of becoming the 
European market leader in financial transaction processing services. 
Deals aimed at increasing market power are also found in the manufacturing sector as well as 
in the telecom sector. For example, the purchase of a 50% share in Gibtelecom (GI) by 
Telekom Slovenje (SI) was motivated by the goal of implementing an expansion strategy on 
developed European markets. The deal done by Saudi Telecom to buy Oger Telecom Ltd 
(AE) highlights the goal “to become the undisputed leader in the region.” Other transactions 
are operations of expansion or strategic initiatives in order to offer more landline broadband, 
based on fiber technology. For instance, Emirates Telecommunications purchased Tigo PVT, 
Belgacom bought Tele2 Luxemburg, and Telenor purchased Vimpelcom. 
Diversification 
Diversification is a rationale for many M&A deals performed by financial companies 
acquiring firms operating in other industries. For example, Abn Amro acquired a participation 
in Baarsma Wine Group Holding with the following declared motivation:  
 
“Baarsma Wine Group is a young, dynamic and fast-growing company that has a clear 
vision. It has distinguished itself by its continuous efforts to develop ‘winning 
strategies in wine’ for its various operating companies. We have known the company 
since 2002, and see good opportunities for accelerating its ambition to become the 
European market leader in this segment.”  
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Similarly, a Canadian company, the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation, 
which is engaged in fund management activities,  acquired a stake in  Delta Hotels Ltd and 
the comments of the managements were:  
 
“As Canada's leading first-class hotel brand, Delta is an ideal fit with bcIMC’s 
investment strategy to expand our diversified real estate portfolio to include 
hospitality. Delta's brand recognition, experienced management and dedicated 
employees will be a strong complement to our diversified portfolio of assets.” 
 
Diversification is also the goal of M&A deals performed by SOEs active in other industries. 
The Malaysian Kencana, which is engaged in the provision of offshore and onshore 
engineering, acquired Torsco Sdn which specialized in heavy steel fabrication, erection and 
piping installation, with the aim to “diversify its activities in the oil & gas-related business 
and in the oil & gas fabrication industry in terms of size and capabilities,” while the Canada 
Pension Plan Investment board acquired 100% of the Chilean Sociedad Concesionaria 
Costanera Norte to expand its infrastructure portfolio in a developing market with a strong 
growth rate. 
 
4.2 Innovation 
The innovation rationale drives a number of deals in the electricity sector; they are aimed at 
fostering innovations with impacts on the environment and climate, creating synergies and 
consolidation of enterprises with different technologies, and investing in infrastructure 
projects. 
For instance, the acquisition by Gazprom of a French company, Energie du Porcien, seemed 
to have the aim of developing alternative energy and green projects in Russia, since “it could 
be regarded as a learning experience of green projects in Europe where the market has been 
actively developing during the last 20 years.” Other examples of such deals are the acquisition 
of Eoliennes de la Haute by GDF, in line with Gaz de France’s strategy to invest in wind 
generation companies, the purchase of Generadores Hydroeletricos sa Hidronorte by the 
Colombian enterprise Empresas Publicas de Medelin Esp., and the acquisition of Nuon 
International China BV by China Resource Power Holdings. Moreover, Enel’s entry into the 
US geothermal market AMP Resource LLC, investing in North America, confirms the 
commitment toward environmentally friendly technologies to fight climate change. The 
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Swedish company Vattenfall acquired 100% of the British Amec Wind Energy and the 
comment of the Chief Executive Officer of the Vattenfall Group was:  
 
“AMEC is one of the most respected and experienced engineering services companies 
in the utility sector, whose skills and resources in wind energy are complementary to 
our own. Vattenfall has ambitious plans within the renewable energy sector and we are 
delighted that AMEC’s UK Wind Developments business will be a part of our 
growing portfolio.” 
 
The innovation rationale is also related to the development of physical and technological 
infrastructures. For example, Terna Spa acquired the multi-utility Acea Spa and AEM 
Trasporto Energia Spa with the aim of starting a process of unification of the Italian grid and 
to upgrade one of the technological infrastructures essential to the country’s development, 
thus improving energy system safety and increasing the competitiveness of the Italian 
economic system. Rail Cargo Austria acquired the total shares of MAV Cargo Zrt to expand 
the railway transport in Central and Eastern Europe, while CFL Cargo purchased the 
Midcargo Ab to “extend their rail freight activities towards the north and add another 
Scandinavian country to their geographic range, which is an important factor when providing 
customized door-to-door services to our international customers.” In the local transport sector, 
we can also mention the acquisition of Tramtrack Croydon by Transport Trading Ltd for 
improving the quality of services for citizens:  
 
“Bringing Tramlink into the control of TfL is excellent news for Londoners. This will 
mean we can plan how to make the improvements that are required to cater for ever 
increasing numbers of passengers and provide them with the very best possible 
services.” 
 
4.3 Extraction of rent  
 Gazprom, Qazmunaigaz, and Petroleo Brasileiro are acquirers who are mainly involved in 
these types of deals, which are aimed at strengthening the governments’ position in strategic 
sectors like mining, oil and gas. From 2005 to 2010 Gazprom performed several horizontal 
deals searching for strategic economic alliances. In particular, Gazprom (re)invested in 
domestic firms, such as in Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd, with a strategy of 
entering in the liquefied natural gas market (LNG) and developing an Asian market: “With 
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the entry of Gazprom as Sakhalin Energy’s major shareholder, we are confident that in 
cooperation with the Russian government, we can bring this first Russian frontier LNG 
project to completion, as scheduled, for delivery of LNG to our customers in Japan, Korea 
and the United States.” Gazprom also invested in Finnish companies in order to “start the 
realization of the project to build the North European pipeline,” and in Belarus companies 
“with both the objective global trends in hydrocarbon markets and the level of relationships in 
the gas industry taken into account.”  
The six deals performed by the Kazakhstani company Qazmunaigaz Barlau Ondiru AQ all 
involve extraction of oil and the manufacture of refined petroleum products. It is clear that 
this expansion affords it control of the new merged enterprises in order to increase its market 
position in the extraction of oil, hence this approach accords with a strategic policy to expand 
and reinforce the extraction market in Europe too, where most of the deals have been made 
with Nederland Enterprises. The targets of Qazmunaigaz were the Valsera Holdings and 
Rompetrol companies, which, in turn, were owned by other foreign vendors. The aim of the 
managers was to return a very large asset to the country.  
The Brazilian company Petroleo Brasiliero is involved in the acquisition of cross-country 
targets. The aim seems to be to expand and increase its ownership in the refined petroleum 
products sector across different geographical areas, such as Japan, the US, Poland and 
Uruguay. Here are some comments:  
“Petrobras will take control of the natural gas market in Uruguay. The acquisition fits 
in with Petrobras’s overall strategy of consolidating its position as a Latin American 
market leader” (after the acquisition of Gaseba Spa);  
“The acquisition allows Petrobras to continue its plans to expand into the US market,” 
after the acquisition of Pasadena Refining System Inc.;  
“The conclusion of this operation is in line with the objectives established in the 
Strategic Plan for the consolidation of Petrobras as an integrated energy company with 
a strong international presence and leadership in Latin America. Such markets 
represent excellent potential for growth as well as synergies with existing assets held 
by the company throughout the region” (after the acquisition of Shell Uruguay SA). 
 
4.4 Financial distress  
The majority of deals driven by the motivation ‘financial distress’ took place after the 2008 
financial crisis. They were mainly realized by government agencies or financial state-owned 
acquirers and were aimed at rescuing firms from financial distress. For example, in 2011 the 
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Dubai government purchased all of the shares in Dubai Bank to help the bank pay off some 
debts. Societe Federale de Participations et d’Investissement acquired Dexia Bank Belgium to 
pay off the loans granted by Dexia Bank Belgium to Dexia SA and Dexia Credit Local. Other 
similar operations have been carried out by Temasek, a holding owned by the government of 
Singapore, which acquired Banco the Bajío from Banco de Sabadel because “the divesture of 
Banco del Bajío by Banco de Sabadell is part of the firm’s objectives of shoring up its capital 
levels following a difficult few years for the  banks in Spain,” while GMAC Commercial 
Finance LLC acquired 100% of Betts Global Ltd with the following declared motivation: 
“Betts went into administration on 16/04/09, and has since been purchased by the banking 
consortium.”  
In other examples, in 2007 the Dutch municipality of Amsterdam acquired the total shares of 
Beurs van Berlage Stichting, a company of creative arts and entertainment activities that had a 
deficit of 7 million euros, from the urban district of Stadsdeel Amsterdam-Centrum. The 
Arizona government also made a total acquisition of PMI Mortgage Insurance, a non-life 
insurance company hit by the housing downturn; similarly, the Irish Government acquired 
100% of the distressed insurance company Irish Life.  
A smaller number of deals that belong to this category is also represented by M&As aimed at 
restructuring the vendor’s debt and financial structure, that is deals where the sale of a 
company is performed to reorganize the public debt and to transfer the ownership to another 
state-owned company with a private organization. In this case, Zephyr reports the vendor’s, 
rather than the acquirer’s rationale. For instance, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, the holding owned 
by the Italian government, purchased Simest Spa from the Minister of Economy and Finance 
in order to “reduce the Italian debt.” This type of operation of reorganization of the public 
debt has also been conducted by Empresa de Energia de Bogotá when it acquired Empresa 
Colombiana de Gas from the Colombian government to use the proceeds to buy back the 
foreign debt. Similarly, in 2009 the Tasmanian government sold the total ownership of Tamar 
Valley Power Station in order to use the proceeds to repay the debt: “The sale of Tamar 
represents a significant de-risking for the BBP business, which is a key step towards the 
stabilization of BBP’s capital structure”. 
Table 5 summarizes the most recurring keywords in the reported rationales in the Zephyr data 
set. 
 
<Table 5> 
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5. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we analyze the evidence that we have collected. First of all, Table 6 highlights 
the distribution in the sample of the different groups of rationales according to our taxonomy.  
 
<Table 6> 
 
Almost 64% of the deals performed by SOEs as acquirers are driven by shareholder-value 
maximization motives, such as the deals of Areva, Belgacom, and Caisse de Depots et de 
Consignations. As for rationales that accord with the role of modern state capitalism in the 
economy, “innovation” and “rent extraction” each drive nearly 13% of all deals, while 
financial distress accounts for 10% of the deals. 
The rationale “shareholder-value maximization” is spread across all sectors (Table 7); 
conversely the others are more focused on specific sectors. Indeed, rescue from financial 
distress is more typical for finance and public administration acquirers (with a peak in the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis – Table 8), “innovation” is more relevant in the electricity 
industry, such as the acquisition of the French Energie du Porcien by Gazprom or the 
acquisition of Nuon International China by China Resource Power Holding, and in developed 
countries, while “rent extractions” mainly belong to the mining and oil & gas sector, with a 
higher incidence in South and Central America and Eastern countries, such as the prominent 
deals of Gazprom and Petroleo Brasileiro.  
Domestic deals are more common than cross-border deals in all the groups of rationales, apart 
from the rent-extraction motivation, where the number of cross-border deals is higher, in line 
with the underlying need of this rationale to increase market power (Table 9). 
In terms of share of acquisition, around 80% of deals are represented by majority acquisitions 
(greater than 50% stake). Among them, 143 deals are total acquisitions, with no relevant 
differences between the four types of deals. Regarding the distribution by type of vendor 
(Table 10), public–public deals – that is target acquired from a state-owned vendor – are 
mainly concentrated in the rent-extraction rationale, which typically involves a government-
owned industry. The other public–public deals are equally spread among the remaining 
rationale types. Western Europe has the highest share of deals driven by the shareholder-value 
maximization and innovation rationales, in line with the focus of contemporary state 
capitalism in supporting the development of new industries, processes and products 
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(Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014), while rent-extraction M&As are more concentrated in 
Eastern Europe, and financial distress in Asia, Oceania and the Far East.  
 
<Table 7> 
<Table 8> 
<Table 9> 
<Table 10> 
 
The Chinese case is particularly relevant in our dataset. Indeed, among the 38 deals performed 
by Chinese SOEs as acquirers, almost 90% are motivated by shareholder-value maximization 
goals, by means of efficiency gains, risk diversification, and increase in market power. Deals 
are mainly acquisitions of majority stakes (88%), and targets are spread among several 
industries, such as manufacturing (9 deals), transport (6 deals), construction (5 deals), finance, 
electricity and telecom (4 deals each). Among cross-border deals, two-third of Chinese 
acquisitions have a target in a developed country, such as the acquisition of Intergen (NL) by 
China Huaneng Group, the acquisition of Manassen Foods Australia (AU) by the Shanghai 
Tangjiu Group, the acquisition of the Goss international Corporation (US) by the Shangai 
Electric Group, the acquisition of Qenos (AU) by China National Chemical Corporation. 
These findings - which highlight that almost all Chinese deals in our sample have a 
shareholder-value maximization motivation - are in line with Karolyi and Liao (2017) who 
suggest that the majority of SOEs deals are no differently motivated  than those of private 
firms. In addition, the internationalization of Chinese SOEs by means of acquisitions in 
developed countries is also in line with Xie et al. (2016), who find that performance relative 
to aspirations is a relevant driver behind their rapid growth, as well as with the tendency for 
centrally located firms in China to acquire alliance partners by means of more aggressive 
policy of cross-border M&As deals (Peng 2012). 
Back to the whole sample, interesting information can also be obtained by looking at the 
economic and financial characteristics of the acquirers and targets involved in each deal. 
Specifically, we analyze measures of size (total assets, turnover), performance (EBIT margin, 
return on asset – ROA), and a financial soundness ratio the year prior to the deal, in order to 
analyze the characteristics of deals that belong to the “shareholder-value maximization” 
rationale and to test differences in the groups of deals motivation.  
Table 11 reports the median value, by rationale group, of the considered variables for both 
acquirer and target involved in each deal, while Table 12 reports the results of the Wilcoxon–
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Mann–Whitney test (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann and Whitney 1947), which highlights whether the 
median value of the differences, computed for each deal, is statistically significant.  
 
 
<Table 11> 
<Table 12> 
 
Regarding “shareholder-value maximization” motives, the results indicate that acquirers are 
larger than their targets along several dimensions, such as total assets and turnover, as 
confirmed by the p-value test of the median value of the differences between acquirers and 
targets. Acquirers also have slightly higher performance indicators in terms of EBIT and 
ROA, as well as stronger solvency situations. According to previous studies (see, in 
particular, Clò et al. 2015, pp.571–575), these deals reveal economic and financial 
characteristics similar, in size and magnitude, to deals performed by private acquirers, 
strengthening our finding that the majority of deals performed by SOEs are similar to M&As 
performed by private companies.  
Interestingly, comparable results can be detected in all the other groups of rationales, with 
significant differences in magnitude, however. In particular, the differences in firms’ 
characteristics between acquirer and target are greater compared to shareholder-value 
maximization, in terms of total asset, turnover and EBIT margin, especially for innovation 
and rent-extraction rationales. 
We further analyze the acquirers’ characteristics in relation to the three rationale groups that 
specifically belong to government-led M&A rationales. To do so we use the “Shareholder-
Value Maximization” group as our benchmark, i.e. we compare acquirer firms’ characteristics 
in each of the other three groups (“Innovation”, “Rent Extraction”, “Financial Distress”) with 
those of the “Shareholder-Value Maximization” group. In Table 13 we report the results of 
the Mann–Whitney test on the differences in the median, for rationale groups (acquirers only) 
[9]. This table is a subset of  Table 8, where we have all the median values (both for acquirer 
and target )for each rationale. 
 
<Table 13> 
 
The results highlight that, compared to the benchmark group, active SOEs engaged in deals 
that are driven by a mission to strengthen the governments competitive position in domestic 
and cross-border markets – to extract rent from mining, subsoil, oil and gas – are national 
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giants and global players that are relatively big in size, as measured by total assets and 
turnover. They also seem well performing in terms of EBIT margin and ROA (although we 
do not investigate the reasons for such performances) as well as strongly capitalized.  
SOEs that are entering deals in order to play an active role in the development of innovation 
projects and/or competitive physical and technological infrastructures are also large in size,  
but with relatively lower levels of turnover, given their total assets. This result may be read in 
the light of the specificity of their activities, which are less capital-intensive and require more 
long-term investment and returns. While the EBIT margin is statistically higher than the 
benchmark, the ROA is slightly lower (although the p-value is not significant); this is likely 
due to the disproportionately high value of the total asset. 
Finally, with deals performed for debt restructuring or bail-out motivations, the SOEs 
involved have similar total assets but a lower turnover compared to the benchmark. Their 
ROA is lower, not surprisingly, and probably due to a higher debt burden, related to their 
levered financial structure. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
The recent literature on SOEs tends to contradict earlier widely held assumptions about their 
role in the economy in terms of objectives and performance. The traditional literature tended 
to look at SOEs as captured by politicians and overall underperforming in comparison to 
private firms. Some authors, however, most notably for example Musacchio and Lazzarini 
(2014), point to the emergence of a new form of state capitalism, where SOEs compete with 
private firms with similar strategies and objectives. This paper contributes to this debate 
through a novel perspective. We look at SOEs from the angle of the MCC and we analyze in 
detail the reported rationales of a sample of 355 M&A deals performed by SOEs as acquirers 
over the period 2002–2012; our aim, after having creating a taxonomy of deal rationales, is to 
empirically test two alternative hypotheses: Deviation versus Convergence of M&A deal 
rationales between public and private enterprises. 
We find that more than 60% of the deals performed by SOEs as acquirers are driven by 
“shareholder-value maximization” motives, similarly to private enterprise acquirers. The 
other 40% of deals are almost equally spread among three rationales that specifically relate to 
the role of modern state capitalism in the economy: the development of innovative projects 
and competitive infrastructures (“innovation”), the strengthening of competitive positions to 
extract rents or accumulate resources (“rent-extraction”), and the bail-out of financially 
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distressed firms (“financial distress”). The most important finding is that the last rationale, 
which is the only one clearly deviating from the objectives of profit maximization typical of 
private ownership, is by far less important than the others. Given that the recent wave of 
cross-border SOE M&As, especially from Chinese enterprises, has raised regulatory concerns 
in many countries (e.g. the institution of the US Foreign Investment and National Security for 
scrutiny of potential SOE foreign acquirers), our findings, in line with Karolyi and Liao 
(2017), suggest the majority of SOE deals are no differently motivated than those of private 
firms, and may not deserve a specific regulatory scrutiny. 
Moreover, we have analyzed the deals in terms of such rationales, highlighting different 
features according to macro-sector and macro-area variables, and economic and financial 
ratios. Specifically, we find that the rationale “shareholder-value maximization” is spread 
across all sectors and more concentrated in Western countries, while “rent extraction” mainly 
belongs to the mining, and oil & gas sectors, with a higher incidence in South and Central 
America and Eastern countries. The “innovation” rationale is more relevant in the electricity 
industry and in developed countries. Finally, the “rescue from financial distress” rationale is 
typical for acquirers that are not the typical contemporary SOEs, but financial entities and 
other organizations in the public sector, or directly governments.  
As far as accounting indicators are concerned, “shareholder-value maximization” deals reveal 
economic and financial characteristics that are similar, in size and magnitude, to deals 
performed by private acquirers, strengthening our finding that the majority of deals performed 
by SOEs are similar to M&As performed by private companies. Compared to this group of 
deals, “rent-extraction” M&As are performed by SOEs that are relatively big in size, and well 
performing in terms of EBIT margin and ROA. Similarly, “innovation” deals are performed 
by companies that are large in size, but with relatively lower levels of turnover, and exhibit an 
EBIT margin that is statistically higher than the benchmark. SOEs engaged in deals 
performed for debt restructuring or bail-out motivations display a lower ROA.  
Overall, these findings suggest that the rescue of firms in financial distress, in spite of the 
Great Recession, is a relatively less frequent deal rationale when SOEs are the acquirers 
compared with shareholder-value maximization and long-term strategic goals.  
While our empirical analysis is based on new evidence, it has some limitations that suggest 
the need for further research. First, it is always difficult to precisely ascertain the motivation 
of managers when they are involved in M&A operations. To the best of our knowledge there 
are no better sources of comparable international evidence than the ones we use (the 
combined Zephyr and Orbis databases), but it would be interesting to study in detail some 
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cases to double-check whether the reported rationales are good descriptions of the actual 
motivations of a deal. This should be left to future research as it possibly would imply 
fieldwork and the collection of evidence from a variety of sources (with some risk in terms of 
consistency and comparability). Second, it would be interesting to correlate the evidence to 
the quality of corporate governance and to the quality of institutions, along the lines, for 
example,  of Faccio (2006) or Borghi et al. (2016), in order to discover whether the alignment 
of objectives between public and private enterprises is enhanced by certain features of the 
public sector management, as suggested by the OECD (2015) Guidelines. The last issue may 
also suggest some policy implications, in terms of reforms of the corporate governance of the 
SOEs and accountability of their management against clearly stated public missions. It would 
be important for citizens to be informed in a transparent way about the rationales of major 
M&A deals when a SOE is on the acquirer side, and the consistency of such rationales with 
the mission assigned by governments to the enterprises they own. Our study also contributes 
to the public debate on the nature of SOE M&As and the regulatory issues raised in many 
countries around the world by the rise of cross-border SOE M&As and the fear they may be 
opaque or driven by unknown motivations (e.g. the institution of the US Foreign Investment 
and National Security Act for the scrutiny of potential SOE foreign acquirers) (Kowalski et al. 
2013). Evidences presented in the paper, in line with Karolyi and Liao (2017), suggest that 
these concerns may be in most of the cases unfounded: the majority of SOE deals – even in 
the Chinese case - appears no differently motivated than private-led deals, and therefore may 
not deserve a specific regulatory scrutiny. 
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Notes 
 
[1] “A state-owned enterprise is: ultimately owned or co-owned by the national or local 
government; internalizing a public mission among their objectives; enjoying full or partial 
budgetary autonomy; exhibiting a certain extent of managerial discretion; operating mainly in 
a market environment, and for which (full) privatization would in principle or de facto be 
possible, but for some reasons, it is not a policy option” Florio (2014, p.201). 
 
[2] SOEs are growing globally: over the last decade, the world’s 2,000 largest SOEs have 
combined more than 6 million employees, operating revenues equal to 19% of global cross-
border sales, aggregate sales for 6% of the world GNI, and nowadays they represent 
approximately 10% of global gross domestic product (Bruton et al. 2015; Kowalski et al. 
2013). 
 
[3] https://www.bvdinfo.com 
 
[4] We consider as state-owned any enterprise whose ultimate owner, defined as the 
independent shareholder with the highest direct or total percentage of ownership, is a central 
or local government entity, public agency, authority or other public sector body. Furthermore, 
we consider the independent shareholder to be the ultimate owner (UO) of an enterprise if it 
holds more than 25 percent of shares (usually regarded as granting control or at least a large 
influence in decision-making, see Christiansen and Kim, 2014). 
 
[5] Indeed, when defining the ownership type of any enterprise involved in the deal, there is 
the possibility to wrongly consider as state-owned a firm that is state-owned nowadays, but 
was not state-owned at the time of the deal. This misreading may happen both on the acquirer 
and on the target side. To avoid this potential error, we restricted our sample to those 
observations for which the ultimate owner of both the acquirer and the vendor has not 
changed since the time of the deal.  
 
[6] We use the term “state-owned” instead of “public” to indicate a state-owned enterprise 
because this term can be confused with the “publicly listed but privately owned firms.” 
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[7] We are aware that any classification may simplify the complexity underlying deal 
rationales, since different motivations may not be exclusive to each other. For example, 
synergy gains may motivate mergers in search of strengthening market power, while technical 
efficiency may be pursued through product and diversification strategies. We are also aware 
that non-profit maximization motives, clearly identified in the empirical analysis, are unlikely 
to be explicitly declared as the rationale of the deal.  
 
[8] See Musacchio et al. (2014) for an analysis of strategic and governance implications of 
new varieties of state capitalism. 
 
[9]The Mann & Whitney test (1947) is a nonparametric rank sum test for significance of the 
change in median values. Since the distribution of the financial variables for the acquirers are 
quite different, we use the Mann–Whitney test to validate the median values, Indeed, the test 
shows whether the distributions are independent. 
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Table 1. Number of deals by sectors.  
Nace sectors Total deals  Deals in same sector Domestic deals  Cross-border deals  
Agriculture 4 2 4 - 
Construction 16 6 14 2 
Electricity 44 32 44 23 
Finance 105 46 55 50 
Manufacturing 33 19 19 14 
Mining 43 15 21 22 
Oil & Gas 5 0 2 3 
Other 18 10 15 3 
Public 25 0 24 1 
Telecom 25 21 11 14 
Transport 31 27 16 15 
Waste & Water 6 2 2 4 
Total 355 180 204 151 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD) 
 
Table 2. Number of deals by country (acquirer and target) 
 
Macroarea Country No. of Deals of Acquirer No. of Deals of Target 
Africa & Middle East AE 16 2 
 BH 2 2 
 SA 4  
Asia - Oceania - FarEast AU 5 7 
 CN 38 33 
 HK 7 3 
 ID 3 3 
 IN 3 6 
 JP 4 4 
 KR 4 3 
 KZ 7 3 
 MY 24 23 
 SG 7  
 NZ  2 
 PH  2 
 PK  3 
 SG  2 
Eastern Europe BG  4 
 BY  4 
 CZ 5 3 
 EE 3  
 HU  3 
 LT 2 3 
 PL 4 4 
 RO  2 
 RU 28 19 
 SI 4  
 UA 2 5 
North America CA 7 8 
Page 32 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijpsm
International Journal of Public Sector Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Public Sector Management
 2
 US 17 20 
South & Central America BM  2 
 BR 4 2 
 CO 7 3 
 EC 2 2 
 JM  2 
 KY  4 
 MX  2 
 PA  2 
 TT 2  
 UY  2 
 VE 2 2 
Western Europe AT 9 6 
 BE 7 8 
 CH 6 6 
 DE 7 11 
 DK 4 4 
 ES 5 7 
 FI 10 7 
 FR 21 17 
 GB 8 20 
 IE 3 4 
 II 3  
 IS 2  
 IT 11 10 
 LU 2 3 
 NL 18 20 
 NO 6 6 
 SE 8 4 
 TR  3 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD). In this table we do not consider the countries with only 
one deal  
 
 
Table 3. Top-10 SOE M&A by deal value 
 
Acquirer name Vendor name Target name Deal type Deal value 
(th Euro) 
Saudi Basic 
Industries Co. 
General Electric 
Company 
Ge Plastics Acquisition 100% 8.464.056 
Argentinean 
Government 
Repsol-Ypf Sa Ypf Sa Acquisition 51% 7.604.405 
Gazprom  Mitsui & Co., Ltd 
Mitsubishi 
Corporation 
Royal Dutch Shell Plc 
Sakhalin Energy 
Investment Company 
Ltd 
Acquisition 50% plus 
one share 
5.499.590 
Areva Sa Urenco Ltd Enrichment Technology 
Company Ltd 
Acquisition 50% 3.000.000 
Swisscom Ag Vodafone Group Plc Swisscom Mobile Ag Acquisition increased 
from 75% to 100% 
2.680.462 
China Huaneng 
Group 
Gmr Infrastructure Ltd Intergen Nv Acquisition 50% 2.216.631 
Abn Amro Holding 
Nv 
Banca Popolare 
Italiana Scarl 
Banca Antoniana 
Popolare Veneta Spa 
Acquisition increased 
from 25.89% to 
55.8% 
2.100.000 
Belgacom Sa Vodafone Group Plc Belgacom Mobile Nv Acquisition increased 
from 75% to 100% 
2.000.000 
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Caisse Des Depots 
Et Consignations 
Institutional 
Investors 
Sacyr Vallehermoso 
Sa 
Eiffage Sa Minority stake 
33.237% 
1.920.235 
Qazmunaigaz 
Ulttyq Kompaniasy 
Aq 
Rompetrol Holding Srl Rompetrol Group Nv, 
The 
Acquisition 75% 1.833.583 
 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD).  
 
 
Table 4. Deals belonging to the different types of rationales 
 Deal 
Year 
Deal Type Acquirer Target Country 
Acquirer 
Country 
Target 
SHAREHOLDERS VALUE MAXIMISATION 
 
Technical and strategical efficiency 
 2006 Acquisition 50% Areva Sa Enrichment 
Technology Company 
Ltd 
FR GB 
 2009 Capital Increase Shanghai Electric Group Co., 
Ltd 
Goss International 
Corporation 
CN US 
 2009 Acquisition 
100% 
Ruag Holding Ag Oerlikon Space Ag CH CH 
 2006 Acquisition 
100% 
Sicap Ag Swapcom CH FR 
Market Power 
 2008 Acquisition 
100% 
Th Plantations Bhd Ladang Bukit Belian 
Sdn Bhd 
MY MY 
 2012 Acquisition 
100% 
Th Plantations Bhd Th Ladang (Sabah & 
Sarawak) Sdn Bhd 
MY MY 
 2005 Acquisition 
100% 
Abn Amro Holding Nv Bank Corluy 
Effectenbankiers 
NL BE 
 2011 Acquisition 
100% 
Itella Information As Newsource Gmbh NO DE 
 2007 Acquisition 50% Telekom Slovenije Dd Gibtelecom Ltd SI GI 
 2008 Minority stake 
35% 
Saudi Telecom Company Oger Telecom Ltd SA AE 
 2009 Acquisition 
100% 
Emirates 
Telecommunications 
Corporation 
Tigo Pvt Ltd AE LK 
Diversification 
 
 2007 Institutional buy-
out 
Abn Amro Participaties Bv Baarsma Wine Group 
Holding Bv 
NL NL 
 2007 Institutional buy-
out 100% 
British Columbia Investment 
Management Corporation 
Delta Hotels Ltd CA CA 
 2007 Acquisition 
100% 
Kencana Hl Sdn Bhd Torsco Sdn Bhd MY MY 
 2012 Minority stake 
49.99% 
Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board 
Sociedad 
Concesionaria 
Costanera Norte Sa 
CA CL 
       
INNOVATION 
 2012 Minority stake 
21.74% 
Gazprom Oao Energie Du Porcien 
Sas 
RU FR 
 2007 Acquisition 
100% 
Gaz De France Sa Eoliennes De La Haute 
Lys Sa 
FR FR 
 2010 Acquisition Empresas Publicas De 
Medellin Esp 
Generadores 
Hidroelƒctricos Sa 
Hidronorte Sa 
CO GT 
 2007 Acquisition 
100% 
Enel North America Inc. Amp Resources Llc US US 
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 2012 Acquisition 
100% 
Eni Spa Nuon Belgium Nv IT BE 
 2005 Acquisition 
100% 
Terna - Rete Elettrica 
Nazionale Spa 
Acea Trasmissione Spa IT IT 
 2007 Acquisition Terna - Rete Elettrica 
Nazionale Spa 
Aem Trasporto Energia 
Srl Electrical 
Substation In 
Moncalieri 
IT IT 
 2008 Acquisition 
100% 
Rail Cargo Austria Ag Mav Cargo Zrt AT HU 
 2012 Acquisition 51% Cfl Cargo Sa Midcargo Ab LU SE 
 2008 Acquisition 
100% 
Transport Trading Ltd Tramtrack Croydon 
Ltd 
GB GB 
EXTRACTION OF RENT 
 2007 Acquisition 50% 
plus one share 
Gazprom Oao Sakhalin Energy 
Investment Company 
Ltd 
RU RU 
 2007 Acquisition 50% Qazmunaigaz Barlau Ondiru 
Aq 
Kazgermunai Llp KZ KZ 
 2005 Minority stake 
8.33% 
Qazmunaigaz Ulttyq 
Kompaniasy Aq 
Agip Kazakhstan 
North Caspian 
Operating Company 
Nv 
KZ NL 
 2006 Acquisition 50% Qazmunaigaz Ulttyq 
Kompaniasy Aq 
Valsera Holdings Bv KZ NL 
 2007 Acquisition 75% Qazmunaigaz Ulttyq 
Kompaniasy Aq 
Rompetrol Group Nv, 
The 
KZ NL 
 2009 Acquisition 
increased from 
75% to 100% 
Qazmunaigaz Ulttyq 
Kompaniasy Aq 
Rompetrol Group Nv, 
The 
KZ NL 
 2010 Acquisition 
increased from 
87.5% to 100% 
Petrobras International 
Braspetro Bv 
Nansei Sekiyu Kk NL JP 
 2006 Acquisition 51% Petroleo Brasileiro Sa Gaseba Sa BR UY 
 2006 Acquisition 50% Petroleo Brasileiro Sa Pasadena Refining 
System Inc. 
BR US 
 2006 Acquisition 
100% 
Petroleo Brasileiro Sa Shell Uruguay Sa BR UY 
       
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 2011 Acquisition 
100% 
Dubai Government Dubai Bank Pjsc AE AE 
 2011 Acquisition 
100% 
Federale Participatie- En 
Investeringsmaatschappij / 
Societe Federale De 
Participations Et 
D'investissement 
Dexia Bank Belgium BE BE 
 2012 Minority stake 
20% 
Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd 
Shareholders 
Banco Del Bajêo Sa SG MX 
 2009 Acquisition 
100% 
Gmac Commercial Finance 
Llc Nedbank Capital Cit 
Group Inc. Glitnir Corporate 
Finance 
Betts Global Ltd US GB 
 2007 Acquisition 
100% 
Gemeente Amsterdam Beurs Van Berlage 
Stichting 
NL NL 
 2011 Acquisition 
100% 
Arizona Government Pmi Mortgage 
Insurance Company 
US US 
 2012 Acquisition Cassa Depositi E Prestiti Spa Simest Spa Fintecna 
Spa Sace Spa 
IT IT 
 2007 Acquisition 
100% 
Empresa De Energia De 
Bogota Sa Esp 
Empresa Colombiana 
De Gas Esp 
CO CO 
 2008 Acquisition 
100% 
Tasmanian State 
Government 
Tamar Valley Power 
Station 
AU AU 
 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD).  
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Table 5. Keywords by deal type 
 
Shareholder-value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent-extraction Financial distress 
Economies of scale and 
scope; sinergies; 
financial efficiency; 
risk reduction by means 
of product and 
geographic 
diversification; increase 
in market power. 
Green projects; climate 
change; energy system 
safety; fostering 
innovation; 
development of 
physical 
infrastructures; 
acquiring skills and 
know-how. 
Strategic sectors; 
government position; 
strategic economic 
alliances; market 
position; strategic 
plan; leadership; new 
market entry. 
Financial crisis; 
rescuing firms; 
restructuring the 
vendor’s debt; 
reorganization; 
stabilisation; lowering 
the cost of capital. 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD) 
 
 
 
Table 6. Number of deals by rationales.  
Motivation  Number of deals        % 
Shareholders-value maximization 227  (63.9%) 
Innovation 45 (12.9%)                 
Rent extraction 47 (13.2%) 
Financial distress 36 (10.14%) 
Total 335 (100%) 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD) 
 
 
Table 7. Number of deals by rationales and sectors. 
Sector Shareholder-value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent-extraction Financial distress 
Construction 13 (6%) 2 (4%) - (0%) 1 (3%) 
Electricity 15 (7%) 20 (44%) 7 (15%) 2 (6%) 
Finance 80 (35%) 5 (11%) 4 (9%) 16 (44%) 
Manufacturing, 
agriculture 
33 (15%) - (0%) 2 (4%) 2 (6%) 
Mining, Oil & gas 13 (6%) 4 (9%) 30 (64%) 1 (3%) 
Other 20 (9%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 2 (6%) 
Public Administration 14 (6%) 2 (4%) 2 (4%) 7 (19%) 
Telecom 18 (8%) 5 (11%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 
Transport 21 (9%) 6 (13%) 1 (2%) 3 (8%) 
Total 227 (100%) 45 (100%) 47 (100%) 36 (100%) 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD) 
 
Table 8. Number of deals by rationale and period of time. 
Sector Shareholder- Innovation Rent-extraction  Financial distress  (4) Total 
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value 
maximization 
(1) 
(2) (3) 
Pre 2008  
81 (36%) 12 (27%) 18 (38%) 5 (14%) 116 
(33%) 
After 2008 
146 (64%) 33 (73%) 29 (62%) 31 (86%) 239 
(67%) 
Total 
227 (100%) 45 (100%) 47 (100%) 36 (100%) 355 
(100%) 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD) 
 
 
Table 9. Cross-border deals by rationales. 
Type of Rationale Shareholder 
value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent-
extraction  
Financial 
distress 
Total 
Domestic deals 130 (57%) 26 (58%) 19 (40%) 29 (81%) 204 (57%) 
Cross-border deals 97 (43%) 19 (42%) 28 (60%) 7 (19%) 151 (43%) 
Total 227 (100%) 45 (100%) 47 (100%) 36 (100%) 355 (100%) 
Sources: our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD) 
 
 
 
Table 10. Number of deals by rationales and type of vendor.  
Sector Shareholder-value 
maximization (1) 
Innovation 
(2) 
Rent-
extraction  
(3) 
Financial distress  (4) Total 
Public-public 
54 (24%) 11 (24%) 22 (47%) 8 (22%) 95 
(27%) 
Public-private 
173 (76%) 34 (76%) 25 (53%) 28 (78%) 260 
(73%) 
Total 
227 (100%) 45 (100%) 47 (100%) 36 (100%) 355 
(100%) 
 
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD) 
 
 
 
Table 11. Pre-deal economic characteristics and financial indicators of acquirer 
and target  (median value). 
Variables Shareholder-value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent 
extraction 
Financial 
distress 
     
Total asset° of acquirer 1,397,429 17,591,401 17,574,590 1,957,415 
Total asset° of target 140,548 214,427 274,330 844,254 
Turnover° of acquirer 631,272 1,134,622 3,962,076 450,577 
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Turnover° of target 91,281 263,574 144,943 406,593 
Ebit margin°° of acquirer 12.61 20.22 33.26 22.82 
Ebit margin°° of target 12.49 9.36 20.34 8.73 
ROA§ of acquirer 7.16 5.81 12.83 4.64 
ROA§ of target 6.73 5.28 8.91 3.06 
Solvency ratio§§ of acquirer 46.20 38.86 58.29 45.10 
Solvency ratio§§ of target 41.25 33.55 38.49 34.44 
     
°thousands of Euro; °°Ebit/Turnover; §Profit before taxes/total asset; §§equity/total asset 
Source: Our elaboration on Zephyr-Orbis: the sample is balanced for each single variable 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Differences between acquirer and target (median value). 
Variables Shareholder-value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent 
extraction 
Financial 
distress 
     
Total asset°  308,029*** 33,678,936*** 20,540,920*** 428,159** 
Turnover°  203,398*** 739,604** 1,876,507*** 6,639 
Ebit margin°°  0 4.26* 3.03 -2.61 
ROA§  -0.51 0.94 -0.26 -0.80* 
Solvency ratio§§  -1.05 18.98 2.92 0 
     
°thousands of Euro; °°Ebit/Turnover; §Profit before taxes/total asset; §§equity/total asset 
Source: Our elaboration on Zephyr-Orbis: the sample is balanced for each single variable. All the 
absolute values are in Thousand of Euro; the Ratios are in in percentage; p-value according to the 
Wilcoxon test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 13. Statistical significance test in median distribution for acquirers by 
groups of rationales (‘shareholder value maximisation’ as benchmark) 
Variables Innovation Rent extraction Financial distress 
    
Total asset°  16,193,415*** 16,177,161*** 559,986* 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.1253) 
Turnover°  503,350* 3,330,804** -180,695 
 (0.0388) (0.0573) (0.9123) 
Ebit margin°°  7.61* 20.65*** 10.21* 
 (0.0552) (0.0120) (0.0868) 
ROA§  -1.35 5.67** -2.52*** 
 (0.1968) (0.0336) (0.0026) 
Solvency ratio§§  -7.34 12.09* -1.10 
 (0.3001) (0.1430) (0.6986) 
    
°thousands of Euro; °°Ebit/Turnover; §Profit before taxes/total asset; §§equity/total asset 
Source: Our elaboration on Zephyr-Orbis: the sample is balanced for each single variable. All the 
absolute values are in Thousand of Euro; the Ratio are in in percentage; p-value in bracket according to 
the Mann & Whitney test, (level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Figure 1. Number of deals by macroareas.  
	  	  
Sources: Our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD) 	  
Page 40 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijpsm
International Journal of Public Sector Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
